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Epstein: The Case for Western Sahara

BEHIND CLOSED DOORS:
"AUTONOMOUS COLONIZATION" IN
POST UNITED NATIONS ERA-THE
CASE FOR WESTERN SAHARA

PAMELA EpSTEIN

... The Arabs who have been treated worst of all are the people
of Western Sahara, who have had their country stolen out from
under them. Morocco has occupied Western Sahara - a former
Spanish colony - treated its people barbarously, defied the
International Court of Justice and tried to annex the territory for
its natural resources. Yet hardly any Arabs or Westerners have
ever championed their cause ... 1

INTRODUCTION
The current situation in Western Sahara begs the question "what use is it
to have the support of the United Nations (hereinafter "U.N.") when
powerful countries such as the United States, France, and Spain are
either indifferent or actively oppose the Sahrawi's legitimate right to
self-deterrnination."2 The decolonization of the Western Sahara has
become a permanent fixture on the U.N.'s agenda since 1963 when the
General Assembly labeled it as a non-self-governing-territory

1.
Nicholas D. Kirstof. excerpts from article in The International Herald Tribune, 26 Feb
2004.
2.
Statement of Congressman Joseph R. Pitts, United Nations Fourth Committee of the
6,
2004).
Available
at
United
Nations
General
Assembly
(October
http://www.house.gov/pitts/press/speechesl041006s-UN-wsahara.htm
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(hereinafter "NSGT").3 Located in northwestern Africa, Western Sahara
borders Morocco on the north, Algeria on the northeast, Mauritania to
the east and south with 600 miles of Atlantic Ocean coastline on the
west. To paint ~n accurate pictt1fP. of the 102,703 square mile size, it is
roughly proportional to New Zealand or Colorado.4 Western Sahara's
struggle to enforce the right of self-determination for its people has
silently flown under the radar of the public masses for decades.
Ironically, this small, remote part of the planet has been classified as one
of the most contentious, protracted, yet straightforward cases of
decolonization and self-determination the U.N. has ever encountered.5
The U.N. General Assembly, the U.N. Security Council, and the
International Court of Justice all have unambiguously recognized the
legal right of the people of Western Sahara to engage in selfdetermination.
Complexity surrounds the unresolved situation raIsmg issue of the
territory'S legal status, the implementation of the right to selfdetermination as well as the legitimate expansion to include human rights
and natural resource protection. The stability of the region can be
characterized as highly volatile. Yet, the conflict rages on never nearing
a resolution. The success or failure of the U.N. to implement a free and
fair referendum will either strengthen or severely cripple the credibility
of the current international legal system and the U.N.'s role within it. As
the world marked the 60 th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights in December of 2008, it was not just a time for joyous
celebration, but rather a time of refection and action. If the U.N. is to
remain progressive and endure another 60 years of human rights
victories, it must no longer allow the atrocities of the past to continue.
There is no greater injustice than ignorance. Western Sahara can no
longer be forgotten in the shadows or swept under the rug.
The continuous denial of Western Sahara's exercise of the right to selfdetermination finds its roots in Morocco's 1975 invasion and with time
has been marginalized by the international community at large. The
Moroccan government has engaged in a systematic violation of human
rights while illegally prospering from the exploitation of Western
3.
U.N. Sec. Council S/20021161 (12 February 2002) Letter dated 29 January 2002from the
Under·Secretary-General for Legal Affairs. the Legal Counsel. addressed to the President of the
Security Council. At pg 2 para. 5. View at www.arso.eslOlaeng.pdf NSGT was intended to apply
automatically to all "territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of selfUnited Nations Charter art. 73.
For full text of article 73 see
government."
http://www.un.orglaboutunlcharter/Chapter XI.
4.
See http://flagcounter.comlfactbookleh
5. Laurence Hanaur, The Irrelevance of Self-Determination Law to Ethno-National Conflict:
A New Look at the Western Sahara Case. 9 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 133, 142 (1995).
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Sahara's natural resources. 6 The illegal annexation of Western Sahara by
force must be recognized for what it is and Morocco should no longer be
rewarded for their 'bad behavior'. The sheer fact that it has been over
thirty years since Spain withdrew from the territory and the issue of
sovereignty remains unresolved is a tragic testament to the failure of
present day international institutions and international law to generate a
proper mechanism to enforce the universally espoused principles of
decolonization, dispute settlement mechanisms, and the right to selfdetermination of indigenous peoples. In addition illuminating serious
concerns regarding the policy of the United States and other members of
the Security Council with respect to these issues and the future role of
the U.N. in upholding its mission to guarantee the international peace
and security, while enforcing the hallowed principle of a people's right to
self-determination. 7
This paper's central objective is to highlight, through a critical
assessment of the conflict, a compelling case for the independent State of
Western Sahara. Part I provides a snapshot of the conflict from the time
of Spanish colonial rule, paying particular attention to the International
Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, the Moroccan
invasion and subsequent illegal occupation of Western Sahara, the U.N.
attempted referendum under MINURSO, concluding with the most
recent extension of the U.N. mandate. Part II articulates the argument
for statehood by evaluating Western Sahara's claims under the binding
authority of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties
of States (hereinafter "Montevideo Convention").

6.
United Nations GAlSPD/373 Maintaining focus 0/1 Western Sahara. Fourth Conunittee
Hears 23 nwre Petitioners. Sixty-second G.A. 4th meeting 10 October 2007 View at:
http://www.un.orglNews/Press/docsI2007/gaspd373.doc.htm
7.
These principles have a place of prominence in Article I of Chapter I of the U.N. Charter
which is entitled "Purposes and Principles" and states: The Purpose of the United Nations are:
I. To maintain international peace and security. and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the
suppression of acts of aggression other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by
peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law,
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to
breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to
strengthen uni versal peace.
3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these
common ends.
U.N. Charter, art. I para. 2 (emphasis added). http://www.un.orglaboutunlcharter/
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Part III discusses the legal principle of self-determination.
The
normative evolution of this principle is highlighted through a historical
accounting of its American origins with Thomas Jefferson and Woodrow
Wilson to the current customary international law principle as defined by
U.N. resolution 1514 (XV). This section will bring to light the irony
that, while the U.N. supported the granting of a fully independent East
Timor to its people, there is a clear attempt to adopt a completely
different and contradictory approach to an identical situation in Western
Sahara. Part III concludes with a discussion of the normative progression
of the right to self-determination, highlighting the incorporation of a
human rights component as demonstrated by Kosovo's declaration as an
independent state, as well as the right to natural resources.
Part IV seeks to expose the role power politics has played in the thirtyplus year delay of the U.N. mandated referendum. This section will
critically examine the ineffective role the U.N. Security Council has
played in resolving the conflict, focusing on the actions of France and the
U.S. Part V dissects the 2007 Autonomy Plan (hereinafter the "Plan")
offered by Morocco and the continued failure to recognize the
Saharawi's people's right to self-determination in a fair, free, and
democratic manner. If any other solution besides this fundamental tenant
of international and human rights law is utilized, it will only lead to
further instability and conflict in the region, which may ignite a
catastrophic spark that could potentially lead to a third world war.
Finally, this paper will conclude with a policy argument for the use of
Chapter 7 powers by the U.N. Security Council.
PART ONE: A SNAPSHOT OF A CONFLICT - WESTERN
SAHARA
A.

FROM THE PRE-SPANISH COLONIZATION IN THE 1880s TO SPANISH
WITHDRAWAL IN 1974

"Spanish Sahara," Western Sahara's former moniker, was colonized by
Spain in 1884. 8 The indigenous people date back to the 12th century,
when Arab tribes from Yemen migrated into the region. They mixed
with the local Berber population and African groups from south of the
Sahara. 9 During this time, the Kingdom of Morocco was a colony of
France, which achieved its independence in 1955. In the 1960s, Spain
began taking advantage of the abundant phosphate resources in Western

8.
9.

See. Western Sahara, 1975I.C.J. 12, para. 77 (Oct. 16) (advisory opinion).
[d.
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Sahara for their own economic benefit. 1O Other natural resources often
exploited in the region are oil and fish stocks. I I The 1960s also saw the
emergence of Saharawi nationalism, as nomadic Saharawi's settled in the
region. The Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el Hamra y Rio
de Oro (hereinafter "Polisario Front") was created on May 10, 1973 by
Sahrawi students in the city of Rabat. The Polisario Front established
itself as the representative of the people of Western Sahara and the
government-in-exile, the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic
("SADR").12
B.

THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE ("ICJ") ADVISORY
OPINION (1974-1975)

In 1966, the U.N. General Assembly adopted its first resolution
regarding Western Sahara. It requested Spain, as the administering
power, to engage in a referendum on self-determination for the people of
Western Sahara.13 As Spain began to make arrangements for a
referendum, Morocco and Mauritania began to make bids for the
territory, even threatening military violence if a referendum with
independence appeared on the ballot. 14 Tensions reached a boiling point,
resulting in the U.N. General Assembly's adoption of a resolution
requesting Spain to postpone its planned referendum, in order to obtain
an advisory opinion from the ICJ. Two questions were posed to the
Court: (1) whether Western Sahara had been a terra nullis l5 at the time of
Spanish colonization l6 and if not, (2) what was the legal relationship
between Western Sahara and Morocco and Western Sahara and
Mauritania [prior to Spanish colonization].17 According to the ICJ

10. The United Nations Failure in Southern Morocco, GlobalSecurity.org (1997),
http://www.globalsecurity.org/militaryllibary/reportJI997/Said.htm
II.
Infra to the notes dealing with the oil/natural resources - Hans Morten Haugen, The Right
to Self-Determination and Natural Resources: The Case of Western Sahara, 3/1 Law, Environment
and Development louranl (2007), p. 70 available at http://www.1ead-journal.org/contentl07070.pdf
12.
Kamal Fadel, The decoloniwtion process in Western Sahara, Indigenous Law Bulletin vol.
4, issue 23 (Aug/Sept 1999).
13.
GAOR, 19th Sess., Annex No.8 (part I) U.N.Doc N5800/Rev.1 (1964), pg. 290-91.
14.
Principle VI, G.A.Res. 1514(XV) 15 December 1960, Peoples VI-IX U.N.Doc N4684
(1960), GAOR 15th Sess., Supp. 16, at 29.
15.
Western Sahara supra note 7, at para 162. Defined as land belonging to no one.
16.
G.A.Res 3292, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31, UN Document N963 I 1974, paras. 103-4
17.
Western Sahara, 1975 I.e.J. 12 (Oct.\6). In a resolution dated 13 September 1974, the
General Assembly of the United Nations asked the leI to issue an advisory opinion on the following
questions: (I.) Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet EI Hamra) at the time of colonization by
Spain a tenitory belonging to no one (terra nullius»? (II.) If the answer to the first question is in the
negative, what were the legal ties between the tenitory and the Kingdom of Morocco and the
Mauritanian entity?
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determination, a sovereign nation must include a specified territory and
jurisdiction l8
The crux of both Morocco l'Ind Mauritania's arguments for control rely
on circumstances occurring prior to Spanish colonization, the claims
themselves are divergent and will be analyzed separately for their merit.
Morocco submitted it had maintained a "continued display of authority"
through its historical and political ties. 19 Morocco emphasized the
alleged religious allegiance owed by the Saharawi' s to its Sultan,
claiming it was tantamount to territorial sovereignty.2o
Further
supporting its contention, Morocco offered evidence rooted in traditional
Islamic legal principle of Bayya which asserts an allegiance amounting
to a "contractual agreement whereby the Muslim community offered a
conditional loyalty to the leader in response to their recognition of
obligation under the Sharaia."21 Morocco sought to reinforce its claim
through the use of uti possideties juris, a principle adopted by the IC] in
the case of Burkina Faso v. Mail, requiring nations to respect preestablished territorial borders and frontiers.22
Morocco continues to
assert its alleged right to exercise continued sovereignty over "its
territory" (including the Western Sahara), having its borders remain
unchanged, and maintaining its territorial integrity.
The Court in its analysis acquiesced Morocco by finding a "legal tie of
allegiance" between the Sultan and some of the Saharawi tribes. 23 Yet,
despite what the Court conceded as "legal ties," (the cultural and social
links), it rejected Morocco's overall territorial claims, stating that the
appointment of caids (local administrators) and various taxes merely
confirmed the existence of Sahrawian tribal leaders' authority.24 The
Court also found that the sultan's sherifian religious status did not
18.
Fadel supra note 26, citing George Joffe, International Court of Justice and the Western
Sahara, in Richard Lawless and Laila Monahan (eds.) War and Refugees: The Western Sahara
Conflict (1987) at 26.
19.
Western Sahara, 1975 I.e.J. at 42. Morocco referred to Legal Status of Eastern Greenland,
which established the continued display of authority as the criterion for establishing title to a
territory. Legal Status of Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), P.C.U. (ser. AlB) No. 53 (Ap.5). See also B
rieriy, The Law of Nations (6th ed. 1963). The author notes that "effective occupation," involves
both the exercise of sovereignty and the intention to act as sovereign, is required in order to create
title to territory.ld. at 162-73. In addition to Hanaur, supra note 5 at 162.
20.
Western Sahara, 1975 I.e.J. at 42-22 (describing Morocco's Islamic arguments); also see
Ricciadrdi, supra note 7 at 420. (Analyzing Morocco's Islamic legal arguments.); also see Hanaur,
supra note 5 at 162.
21.
See. Mathew M. Ricciardi, Title to the Aouzou Strip: A legal and Historical Analysis. 17
Yale J.lnt'l L. 301,418 (1992) (discussing Morocco's Islamic legal arguments).
22.
Burkia Faso v. Mail, 1986 I.e.J. 554, (Dec. 22). See also, George Joffe, Selfdetennination and Uti Possidetis: The Western Sahara and the "Lost Provinces" (1996).
23.
Western Sahara, 1975 I.e.J. at 45. See also, Hanaur supra note 5 at 162 ..
24.
Id. at 39
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represent an exercise of territorial sovereignty.25 The Court ultimately
held that the evidence Morocco produced did "not establish any tie of
territorial sovereignty between Western Sahara and Morocco.
Specifically, Morocco failed to display any effective and exclusive State
activity in Western Sahara."26 The Court's determination mandated that
only ties of a formal, traditional political and legal nature between the
state and the colony could overcome the application of the principle of
self-determination, not the cultural and religious ties, or vague oaths of
allegiance.
At the time of Spain's colonization of Western Sahara, Mauritania, had
not yet achieved state sovereignty. Therefore, Mauritania could not act
with legitimate international legal personality and was subsequently
barred from arguing the "legal ties of State sovereignty" as Morocco. As
a result the Court focused its analysis on what it characterized as "other
legal ties" that existed between Western Sahara and the Mauritanian
entity, specifically those of a "racial, linguistic, religious, cultural and
economic nature."27 The Court confered some credence to Mauritania's
claim by finding certain ties of a legal character between the tribes of
Western Sahara and those of neighboring regions of the Bilad Shinguittie
[the Mauritian entity].28 [T]he nomadic peoples of the Shinguitti, in the
view of the Court, could be considered as possessing in the relevant
[Spanish colonial] period rights, including those relating to the lands
through which they migrated. 29 These rights, the Court determined
constituted a legitimate legal tie between Western Sahara and the
"Mauritanian entity" ... and were believed to be vital to the very essence
of life in the region. 30
The Court held that Mauritanian, at the time did not possess sovereignty
in the region, despite the cultural links discussed previously because the
"entity" was unable to manifest a character distinguishable from the
tribes that comprised it. 3l Simply, it was not "an entity capable of
availing itself of obligations incumbent upon its members."32
Regardless of the IC] having recognized some legal ties between all the
three entities, in the end the Court determined that "those ties did not
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

[d.
/d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at 49
at63

at 64-64
at 63
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involve territorial sovereignty or co-sovereignty or territorial inclusion in
a legal entity ... .''33 Having found no territorial legal connection, the
Court based their decision on the fact that the legal relationship was not
of such sufficient strength to establish a territorial sovereign connection
that would affect the decolonization of Western Sahara, especially the
right to self-determination through an authentic and free manifestation of
the Western Saharan people's wilJ.34 In conclusion, the Court found no
relevant international legal doctrines in 1975 to maintain the right of
Morocco (and for a period Mauritania) to occupy or claim sovereignty
over the territory of Western Sahara, and no subsequent actions have
come to pass which would alter this assessment. 35 The fact that no state
since 1975 has legally recognized Morocco's claims as legitimate
highlights the strength of the Court's determination. Furthermore,
U.N.' s classification of Morocco as an "occupying power" has remained
unchanged over the past 30 years, as such it should be afforded only
limited legal rights over Western Sahara's population and natural
resources. 36
C.

POST-IC] DECISION - CREATION OF MINSURO (1975 - 1991)

Two days after the IC] denied Morocco's claim over Western Sahara, it
invaded the territory in the now infamous "Green March." Adding insult
to injury the "Green March" commenced on the eve of Western Sahara's
planned independence from Spain. 37 After Spanish colonial forces
departed in 1976, Morocco took control of the· northern two-thirds of
Western Sahara while Mauritania took the southern third. 38 It was at this
time a clandestine treaty, now referred to as the "Madrid Accords," took
33.
Id. at 67.
34.
Id. at 12. The court "not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application of
Resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of
self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the
Territory." (Emphasis added.)
35. Those who legally support Morocco's position contend that Spain legitimately transferred
sovereignty of the Western Sahara territory to Morocco and Mauritania in 1975, via the "Madrid
Accords" (a treaty between the three parties). However, this is not the case as the Court pointed out
Spain at the time of the accords did not possess "sovereignty" over Western Sahara because it was
then only an "administering power" which could not confer sovereignty over Western Sahara a
designed NSGT to Morocco, Mauritania or any other state. Id. at
36. The recent affirmation of Morocco's "occupational" status can be found in the opinion of
Hans Corell, Undersecretary General for Legal Affairs of the United Nations on 29 January 2002,
regarding the denial of Morocco to enter into oil exploration contracts this will be discussed further
in section three.
37.
Ian Williams & Stephen Zunes, Self Detennination Struggle in the Western Sahara
UN.,
Foreign
Pl'y
in
Focus,
Sept.
2003,
Continues
to
Challenge
the
hnp:/Iwww.fpif.orglpapeslsahara2003.homl; see also Stefan Armbruster, Oil: Western Sahara's
Future, BBC News, Mar. 4, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uklllhilbusinessI2758829.stm
38.
Michael Bhatia, Western Sahara under Polisario Control: Summary Report of Field
Mission to the Sahrawi Refugee Camps, 28 Rev. of African Pol. Econ. 291 (2001)
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place, partitioning Western Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania. 39
To justify their military invasion and for partitioning off the territory,
Morocco and Mauritania attempted· to manipulate the Madrid Accords
into legal title superior to that of U.N. resolutions and the principle of
self-determination found within its Charter. 40 Conflict erupted in 1976
involving Mauritania, Morocco, and the Polisario Front receiving support
from Algeria. 41 Mauritania ended its active role in the conflict in 1979,
making peace with the Polisario Front and abandoning its control over
Western Sahara in favor of Morocco. 42 From 1979 until today, the
sovereignty over Western Sahara has been the impetus of a bitter battle
between the Polisario Front and Morocco, whose forces have been
fighting off and on from 1975 until the U.N.-brokered cease-fire in
1991.43
In reaction to Morocco's forced occupation of Western Sahara,44 the U.N.
Security Council in late 1975 passed hollow Resolutions 37945 and 380,46
which requested the immediate withdrawal of the "Green March" from
Western Sahara. 47
Effectually, these resolutions seemed to coddle
Morocco's insubordination, lacking authority, and simultaneously
undermined of the overarching mission of decolonization set forth by
Resolution 1514. Morocco ignored these resolutions and has continued
to ignore them to this day by maintaining illegal occupation over
Western Sahara. Morocco began to erect a series of defensive walls in
1981, six years into the 16 year armed conflict.48 This resulted in the
"berms"49 six walls, twelve-foot high, ranging in length from 75050 to
137551 miles or more 52 (depending on the sources). The "berms" pose a
39.

Fadel, supra note 10.

40.

Id.

41.

Dr. Barry A. Feinstein and Justus Reid Weiner, Israel's Security Barrier: An International
Comparative Analysis and Legal Evaluation. 37 Geo. Wash. int'I L. Rev. 309 (2005).
42.
Bhatia, supra note 26.
43.
Id.
44.
Williams & Zunes, supra note 25.
45.
S.C. Res. 379, U.N. SCOR, 30th Sess., I 854th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/379 (1975).
46.
Id.
47.
Id.
48.
Williams & Zunes, supra note 25.
49.
Int'! Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor Report 2003: Western Sahara
(2003), http://www.icbLorgllml2003western_sahara.html
50.
Bureau of Political-Military Af£., U.S. Dep't of State, Walk the Earth in Safety: The
United States Commitment to Humanitarian Demining, Appendix F: Hidden Killers 2001 - The
World's Landmine Problem (2001), http://www.state.govltlpmlrlslrptlhkl2001/696I.htm
51.
Bhatia, supra note 26.
52.
According to Fatimetou Mofdh Sidi, of the International Youth and Student Movement for
the United Nations, Morocco's electric fence is 1562 miles long. See Press Release, United Nations
Commission on Human Rights, Commission on Human Rights Adopts Resolutions on SelfDetermination in Western Sahara, Palestine (April 6, 2001) (referring to the fence as "2,500
kilometers long.").
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nearly insurmountable barrier reinforced with an estimated two to three
million anti-personnel and anti-task landmines forming "the world's
largest landmine field."53
It is important to note during the entire discussion and deliberation
process at the U.N. regarding the "berms," Morocco's actions were never
condemned. 54 As it stands today Morocco controls over ninety percent of
Western Sahara,55 referring to the area as "the Sahara provinces."56 Even
more disturbing is the fact that the area under Moroccan control is rich in
natural resources, which Morocco has been able to illegally exploit to its
own advantage. 57
In April of 1991, the U.N. established the United Nations Mission for a
Referendum in
Western Sahara (hereinafter "MINURSO").
MINURSO's initial mission was to be brief-implement a peace plan as
outlined by Security Council resolution 1495.58 In September 1991 an
U.N.-brokered ceasefire was officially declared. The referendum was
supposed to be held in 1992 allowing Western Saharans a choice
between independence and integration with Morocco. 59 The ceasefire
has been the only successful objective of the initial mission. A key point
of contention was the "identification process," which determined what
constitutes an eligible voter in the referendum. 60
D.

THE FLY IN THE OINTMENT: IDENTIFICATION OF VOTERS

Initially, voters were supposed to be identified by a census carried out by
Spain in 1973, because the Polisario did not want Moroccans who had
intentionally settled in Western Sahara after the "Green March" to be
However in May 1996, the U.N.
identified as eligible voters. 61
53.
Landmine Monitor Report, supra note 37. Morocco has an additional thirty-five to forty
heavily armed military soldiers stationed every three or four miles at observation posts with tanks
ready to deploy at a moment's notice. [d. See also, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress,
A Country Study: Mauritania Glossary (n.d.), http://Icweb2.1oc.gov/frdlcslmauritaniaJmr~loss.html
54.
Press Release, U.N. Security Council, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1263 (1999),
Security council Extends Minurso Mandate Until December 14 (Sept. 13, 1999),
http://www.un.orglNewslPress/docsIl999/l99990913.sc6726.doc.html
55.
Bhatia, supra note 26.
56.
William and Zunes supra note 25.
57.

[d.

58.
U.N.
Security
Council
SlRes/1 495
(31
July
2003).
Available
at
http://daccessdds.un.orgldoc/UNDOCIGENIN03/447/80IPDFIN0344780.pdf?OpenElement
59.
Anna Theofilopoulou, United States Institute of Peace Special Report, July 2006 No. 166
The United Nations and Western Sahara: A Never-ending Affair. View at:
http://www.usip.orglpubslspecialreportslsrI66_united_nations_sahara.htm1
60.
[d. See, next section for additional information on the referendum and voter identification
process.
61.
[d.
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suspended the identification process and recalled most MINURSO
civilian staff. Allowing minimal military personnel to stay behind to
oversee the ceasefire. Initial attempts to revive the process floundered
over Morocco's worries that a referendum would not best serve its
interests. 62 The Polisario had a "restrictive view" with a strong desire to
use the 1973 Spanish census as the framework for the identification
process. 63 In contrast, the Moroccan government desired to employ an
"expansive view," which would include tens of thousands of applicants
of Saharan origin now living in Morocco.
E.

U.N. PERSONAL ENVOY TO WESTERN SAHARA: BAKER TO V AN
WALSUM

In an effort by the U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan to revive and
reinvigorate negotiations between the parties, he appointed James A.
Baker III as his personal envoy to Western Sahara. Their goal was to
direct the parties to a "political solution" outside of the "winner-take-all"
approach.64 Under the auspices of the U.N. Special Envoy, negotiations
were held between Morocco and the Polisario on several occasions,
which ultimately led to the Houston Agreement in September of 1997.
The Agreement covered many aspects of the original settlement plan,
including voter identification, refugee repatriation, troop confinement,
release of prisoners, freedom to campaign, access for international
observers, and the U.N. authority to ensure a free and fair referendum
process.65
In 2000, after an assessment of the current situation revealed a
referendum would not be in Morocco's favor, Morocco decided to revisit
an autonomy approach. In 2001, Baker submitted the "Framework
Agreement" to the Security Council.
In 2002, four options for
resolution without the consent of the parties were submitted to the
Security Council by Baker.
Later the Security Council adopted
resolution 1429,66 which rejected all four options and tasked Baker to
provide a proposal for self-determination. 67 Baker's final attempt prior
to his resignation was his Peace Plan for the Self-Determination of the

62.
[d. There was an overwhelming consensus that if a referendum was to proceed where
independence was on the ballot the people of Western Sahara would choose it.
63.
hnp:lfwww.usip.orgJpubslspecialrepons/srI66.pdf
64.
Theofilopoulou, supra note 50.
65.
[d.
66.
[d.
67.
Id
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People of Western Sahara in 2003.68 In an unlikely tum of events, the
Polisario agreed to the terms of the plan and the Security Council
unanimously adopted resolution 1495 69 in support of the peace plan.
Neverthe!ess Morocco rejected the resolution, resulting in Bakers
resignation. Peter van Walsum filled Baker's shoes as the new personal
envoy to Western Sahara. His conclusion regarding the situation was
that there were only two options: continuation of the current stalemate,
which he called "a recipe for violence," or "negotiations without
preconditions."7o He then led the fourth round of negotiations in March
2008 under the idiom, "negotiations without preconditions."71 At the
most recent round of negotiations, "there was hardly any exchange that
could be characterized as negotiations," despite the parties "dynamically
interacting with each other."72
F.

CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS

November 2007 marked the thirty-second anniversary of both the illegal
invasion and subsequent occupation after the "Green March" by
Morocco, as well as the establishment of Western Sahara's governmentin-exile, SADR.73 MINURSO mandate was extended on April 30, 2008
for another year.74 By all accounts, it seems that the case of Western
Sahara will continue to be a permanent fixture on the U.N.'s unfinished
business list.
PART TWO: MAKING THE GRADE, A CASE FOR STATEHOOD
A.

CRITERIA FOR OBJECTIVE STATEHOOD ARE SATISFIED

A "legal person" possesses the capacity to have and maintain certain
rights, and is required to perform specific duties. Such "legal persons"
68.
The Peace Plan provided for a period of autonomy followed by a referendum on seJfdetermination. It was at this point Morocco expressed its current assertion that it will refuse to
accept any referendum in which the independence of Western Sahara would appear as an option.
69.
U.N. Security Council 1495, supra note 49.
70.
Meaning Morocco would not require Polisario to recognize Morocco's sovereignty over
the territory before discussing autonomy and that Polisario would not demand discussion of a
referendum with independence as one of the option before the negotiations.
71.
Included in the negations were both parties as well as, interested parties Mauritania and
Algeria.
n. U.N. Security Council S12008/45 Report of the Secretary-General on the status and
progress of the negotiations on Western Sahara 25 January 2008, para 4.
73.
U.N. Security Council Report of the Secretary-General on Situation Concerning Western
Sahara, S12008125114 April 2008, at 4. For further information see section IV. Activities on the
Ground section A. Military.
View hup:/Iwww.globalpolicy.org/security/issueslwsahara/2008/
04 I4sgrwsahara.pdf
U.N. Security Council SC/93 19 Security Council Extends Western Sahara Mission Until
74.
30 April 2009 30 April 2008.
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are said to be subjects of the law. International personality is held to rest
on recognized acceptance and participation in the international
community. As widely-recognized international legal scholar Hersch
Lauterpacht has said of states: " ... the orthodox positive doctrine has
been explicit in the affirmation that only states are subjects of
international law ."75
The 1933 Montevideo Convention is the most widely accepted sources
defining the term statehood. 76 According to Article One of the
Montevideo Convention, there are four elements that serve as gateway
requirements to assert statehood: (1) a permanent population; (2) a
defined territory; (3) government; and (4) capacity to enter into relations
with other states.77 The requirements of a permanent popUlation and
defined territory provided the physical basis for the existence of a state,
while the government and capacity to enter into international relations
requirements indicate the legal order necessary for a state to function
within the international framework.
Although the Montevideo
Convention was created as a regional treaty,78 it has developed into
customary international law and the criteria have become a touchstone
for the definition of a state, evidenced by Article 38.1 (b) of the ICJ
Statute. 79
1.

Permanent Population

A population indigenous to the territory of Western Sahara has been
legally recognized by both the ICJ and Spanish authorities. According to
the 1974 Spanish census, there are 73,497 indigenous Sahrawi's. 80 The
size of a popUlation is not determinative of whether a population is to be
considered permanent, take for example the state of Nauru, it has been
accepted as a state with a popUlation of 6,500. Furthermore, the
international community has accepted that a population need not be
75.
Johan D. van der Vyver, Sovereignty and Human Rights in ConstitutiOlUlI and
International Law. 5 Emory 1n!'1 L. Rev 321 (1991).
76.
Joshua Castelli no. Territorial Integrity and the "Right" to Self-Determination: An
Examination of the Conceptual Tools. 33 BKNJIK 502 (200S).
65.
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (Montevideo Convention), Dec. 26, 1933,
165 L.N.T.S. 19, 2S Am. J. 1n!'1 L. (Supp.) 75 (1934). (reprinting text of Montevideo Convention)
(ART I) Statehood is equitable to having legal personality within the international community.
7S.
Subin Nijhawan, The Criteria for Statehood in International Law are Based on the
Principle of Effectiveness not Legitimacy. School of Oriental and African Studies Centre for
International
Studies
and
Diplomacy.
(Dec.
2003)
p.
2
View
at
http://www.tamilnation.orgiselfdeterminationl03_criteria_for_statehood.pdf
Formulated at the
Seventh International Conference of American States
79.
I.C.J. Statute 3S.I(b) refers to "international custom" as a source of international law,
specifically emphasizing the two requirements of state practice plus acceptance of the practice as
obligatory or opinion juris.
SO.
Malcom Shaw, The Western Sahara Case, 49 Brit. Y.B. of inti L. 121 (1979).
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restrictively defined in order to be considered permanent, nor does it
need to be located in one designated place for any specific duration of
time. 81 Consequently, regions inhabited by wandering nomads, such as
the Western SahMil, will still be considered a permanent population and
not a terra nullis82 (a territory belonging to no one).83 Western Sahara
with its nomadic ancestry and relatively small numerical population size
equivocally satisfies the first of two physical markers of statehood.
2.

Defined Territory

The defined territory of a State is judged not solely by size or its
precisely defined boundaries. 84 As a result, border disputes between
states, will not cast doubt on the territorial status of a state. Western
Sahara consists of a defined territory with internationally accepted
boundaries (set during the colonial period) that have served to establish
Western Sahara as a separate geographical entity from Morocco, Algeria,
Mauritania, and Spain.85 Nevertheless, it is only important that a state
has a clear core territory in order to be considered a state. 86 As the case
of Western Sahara exemplifies, the denial of certain groups and states (in
this case Morocco) about its existence and the resulting conflict do not
terminate its status as a state.
It is not required by international law that a state have clearly defined
and undisputed borders. In North Sea Continental Shelf cases: 87 "[t]he
appurtenance of a given area, considered as an entity, in no way governs
the precise determination of its boundaries, any more than uncertainty as
to boundaries can affect territorial rights. There is for instance no rule
that the land frontiers of a State must be fully delimited and defined, and

81.
Nijhawan, supra note 66, at 2.
82.
Id. Specifically not organized under European conception of statehood. However, the IC]
in its Western Sahara Advisory Opinion analyzed nineteenth century theories of territorial
acquisition and detennined that lands in northwest Africa acquired by the Spanish during the 1880's
did not amount to terra nullius. See also. Western Sahara, supra note 7. This is important because it
highlights that even at the height of European colonial expansion, not all territory was viewed as "no
man's lang." It may be that viewing territory as terra nullius was the exception rather than the rule.
83.
Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion. I.C.J. Reports 1975. pg. 39, paras. 79-81.
84.
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmnrk; Federal
Republic of Germany v. Netherland), I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 32, para. 46.
85.
The General Assembly established the "salt-water test" for detennining which territories
are to be considered Non-Self-Governing according to Article 73(e) of the UN Charter. Territories
that are "geographically separate and are distinct ethnically and or culturally from the country
administering them" are considered Non-Self-Governing-Territories according to this provision.
G.A. Res. 1541, SIRes/1541 April 29 2004 at 28. Thus, the boundaries of the Western Sahara, under
this provision, give the territory a separate geographical identity fonn that of metropolitan Spain.;
See also, Hanauer supra. note 5 at p.168
86.
Deutsche Continental Gas-Gesellschaft v. Polish State (1929), 5. A.D. II. at pg. 15.
87.
Nonh Sea Continelltal Shelf cases supra note 73, at 32.
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often in various places and for long periods they are not. .. ".88 What is
required is that there be a consistent band of territory that is undeniably
controlled by the government of the alleged state. 89 The Polisario has
significant influence over the inhabitants of living in occupied Western
Sahara and forced refugee camps.90 Yet, those who oppose Western
Sahara's rights counter with the argument that there can be no defined
territory when Morocco controls nearly ninety percent, including all of
the major population and economic centers. Thus, the Polisario is
prevented from exercising any significant contro1. 91
This argument is defeated in that the failure of the Polisario and exiledgovernment SADR to control its territory can be absolutely attributed to
an illegal occupation by Morocco. "States are not extinguished by an
annexation resulting from an illegal use of force and '" a territory
occupied or annexed illegally by force must not, prima facie, be denied
statehood if ... if proclaimed its independence, as long as some of the
criteria of statehood are capable of fulfillment."92 The genesis of
Western Sahara's clearly defined territorial boundaries emerged in the
traditional manner of many African nations during its colonization.
These territorial boundaries have and will continue to exist regardless of
Morocco's illegal occupation and have solidified the second physical
mark of statehood.
3.

and 4. Government and Capacity to enter into relations with other
States

The elements of effective government and capacity to enter into relations
with other states are not as clearly defined. Both elements can be viewed
within the context of Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties.93 Article 31 (1) highlights the need for a government to be
sovereign over its territory and its citizens in order have the capacity to

88.
Id.
89.
See generally, Deutsche Continental Gas, supra note 84.
90.
Anthony G. Pazzanita, Legal Aspects of Membership in the Organization of African Unity:
The Case of the Western Sahara, 17 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 123, 138 (1985).
91. The S.A.D.R. could be said to have achieved de facto government status in the limited
amount of territory that it does control, however, based on the precedent of The Arantzazu Mendi,
1939 App. Cas. 256 (1939). Other issues, such as economic viability and actual independence, also
deserve consideration.
Pazzanita, supra note 67, at 144 (quoting J. Naldi, The Organization of African Unity and
92.
the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, 26 J. Afr. L. (1982)).
93.
Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties, Done at Vienna on 23 May 1969. Entered into
force on 27 January 1980. U.N., Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331. Article 31(1): A treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
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act legitimately within the international community.94 In this context, the
government of a state should be the supreme authoritative body in terms
of creating and enacting laws within the state, with the capability to act
independently when governing its international affairs. 95
Having
exclusive control of international affairs has been commonly referred to
as "external sovereignty."96
In an opinion by Judge Anzilotti he noted:
Independence ... is really no more than the normal condition of
States according to international law; it may also be described as
sovereignty (suprema ptestas), or external sovereignty, by which
is meant that the State has over it no other authority than that of
international law. The idea of dependence therefore necessarily
implies a relation between a superior State and an inferior or
subject State; the relation between the State which can legally
impose its will and the State which is legally compelled to
submit to that will. Where there is no such relation of
superiority and subordination, it is impossible to speak of
dependence within the meaning of international law .. It follows
that the restrictions upon a State's liberty, whether arising out of
ordinary international law or contractual engagements, do not as
such in the least affect its independence. As long as these
restrictions do no place the State under the legal authority of
another State, the former remains an independent State however
extensive and burdensome those obligations may be. 97
In order for Western Sahara to prove some form of government it must
demonstrate effective control over its territory, independent of any other
authority. Western Sahara has an elected government-in-exile, the
SADR, which obtained popular support to govern the region.
Strengthening the resolve of the governing entity, the SADR overtly
challenges the legitimacy of the Moroccan government. SADR has

94.
/d.
95.
Castellino, supra note 73
96.
The state since the time of Westphalia in 1648 has been the chief holder of external
sovereignty. Interference in other states' governing prerogatives has since become illegitimate.
Sovereignty in international is synonymous with external sovereignty. International law scholar,
Alan James similarly 'conceives of external sovereignty as constitutional independence -- a state's
freedom from outside influence upon its basic prerogatives.' Dan Philpott (ed.) Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy Sovereignty rev. June 18, 2003. Citing to Alan James, The Practice of
Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society. Political Studies 47, no. 3 (1999) p.
462-4
97.
Van de Vyver, supra note 64. citing Austro-German Customs Union (Advisory Opinion),
1931 P.C.I.J (ser. NB) No. 41
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taken the appropriate steps in fashioning a strong governmental
blueprint. It has formed a cabinet, has a bureaucracy, directs a military
liberation struggle alongside of the Polisario Front, represents the
Sahrawi people to the international community, and administers the
refugee camps.98
The criterion to enter into relations with other states is evaluated by the
"capacity" of the State. In this context capacity is defined as the
"theoretical ability to enter international relations."99 It is in this instance
that recognition by other countries is invaluable. Western Sahara, and by
extension its government-in exile SADR, possess the ability to enter into
relations with other States, as evidenced by its recognition by sixty plus
states and its acceptance as a full member of the Organization of African
States (now the African Union).lOo The Charter of the African Union
only extends membership to "independent sovereign African state[s])."101
This form of international recognition under the current international
structure has been a key factor in attributing or prohibiting statehood. 102
In the case of Austro-German Customs Union ,03 of 1931 citing to Article
88 104 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain the Court held:
. .. the independence of Austria ... must be understood to mean
the continued existence of Austria within her present frontiers as
a separate State with sole right of decision in all maters
economic, political, financial or other with the result that
independence is violated, as soon as there is any violation there,
either in ·the economic, political, or any other field, these
different aspects of independence being in practice one and
indivisible ..... By "alienation", as mentioned in Article 88, must
98.
Stephen Zunes, The Future of Western Sahara, Foreign Policy in Focus, John Feffer (ed.)
July 20, 2007. View at http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxtf4410
99.
Nijhawan, supra note 66 at p. 3
100.
Franck, T., The Stealing of the Sahara, 70 AJIL 694 at 698 (1976) Summarizing the
position of the United Nations and the OAU as: ..... a territory wishing to join with one or several
neighboring states, it should have the right to manifest that preference in the process of
decolonization, but it must be the free choice of the majority in that particular colony, and a territory
with recognized boundaries may neither be absorbed nor dismembered against the will of its
inhabitants." See also, Zunes, supra, note 93.
101.
O.A.U. Charter, art. 4
102.
Thomas D. Grant, Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its Discontents,
37 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 403, (1999) Take Taiwan as an example, Taiwan as a state, scholars have
argued it satisfies the criteria for statehood under the Montevideo Convention, but, due to its
political situation with the People's Republic of China, most state have refused to recognize it as
such.
103.
Vyver supra note, 92.
104.
[d. "The independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than with the consent of the
Council of the League of Nations. Consequently Austria undertakes in the absence of the consent of
the said Council to abstain from any act which might directly or indirectly or by any means whatever
compromise her independence .... "
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be understood any voluntary act by the Austrian State which
would cause it to lose its independence or which would modify
its independence in that its sovereign will would be subordinated
to the will of another Power or particular group of Powers, or
would even be replaced by such will. 105
The international community has recognized Western Sahara as having a
role within international politics as a result of its ability to portray all the
trappings, of a state-- a self-appointed foreign minister placed into power
following a democratic election, an official flag, and a collective sense of
nationalism. 106 Western Sahara has satisfied the four foundational
requirements of statehood. Its physical characteristics are manifested
through a permanent population and clearly defined borders. SADR,
Western Sahara's government in-exile has been able to conduct its
international affairs in the ways befitting a legally recognized state
thereby overcoming the complex and interpretative requirements of
government and international personality. Western Sahara has achieved
and thus, has been rightly owed statehood status for over 27 years.
PART THREE: THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION
A.

THE ROAD TO SELF-DETERMINATION

The origins of the right to self-determination can be accredited to a
variety of sources. This section focuses on the perspective of its
American origins. The Declaration of Independence, written by Thomas
Jefferson, alluded to numerous principles of self-determination:
.. .in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one
people to dissolve the political bonds which have connected
them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth,
the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and
of Nature's God entitle them, ... all men are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are
Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness. To secure these
rights, Governments are instituted among Men, .... Whenever
any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is
the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new
Government laying its foundation on such principles and
organizing its power in such form .... When a long train of
105.

[d.

106. Michael Bhatia. Repatriation under a peace process: Mandated return in the Western
Sahara, 15 Int'l 1.Refugee L. 786 (2003).
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abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object
evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is
their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to
provide new Guards for their future security.l07
The Declaration of Independence was based upon the ideal that the
people, and not the King, ought to be the foundation of a legitimate
government. lOS The conclusion of World War II saw the next defining
moment in the evolution of self-determination with President Woodrow
Wilson and his now famous Fourteen Points.
In 1918, Wilson
championed the concept that "every people have a right to choose the
sovereignty under which they shall live."109 He continued by suggesting
that, "no peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and
accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from
the consent of the governed ... "110 At that time the concepts he promoted
were unprecedented. There had never been a notion that an "uncivilized"
(non European) people had any legal rights to determine their future; it
had always been "conquer and colonize." "The evolution of the right to
self-determination has been one of great normative narratives of the past
century .... Ever since the words of self-determination left the lips of
Woodrow Wilson; the wider meaning of the words has exited the moral,
political, and legal imagination of oppressed peoples around the
world."I11
The right to self-determination was given international status after 1945,
when it was included in the U.N. Charter. ll2 This right continued to
develop with the 1960 U.N. Declaration on the Granting of Independence
to Colonial Peoples, when the term became synonymous with
decolonization as a major tenant in the U.N.'s mission.ll3 Subsequently,
it was not until the 1970s that another shift occurred modifying the
viewpoint towards the right of a people as opposed to the right of a
territory. It was at this time that the U.N. Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
107. James E. Falkowski, Secessionary Self-Detennination: A Jeffersonian Perspective, 9 B.U.
Int'l LJ. 209 (1991). Citing to the Declaration of Independence.
108.
Id.
109.
Michelle Pomerance, The United States and Self-Determination: Perspectives on the
Wilsonian Conception, 70 AMJ.Int'1 L. 1,2 (1976).
110.
Id.
Ill.
20 Temp. Int'I & Compo LJ. 443 pg 4 citing Richard Falk, Preface to In Pursuit of the
Right of Self-Detennination: Collected Papers & Proceedings for the First International
Conference 011 the Right to Self-Detennination & the United Nations, Geneva 2000, at 6-7 (Y.N. K1y
& D. K1y eds., 2001).
112. It is important to note that at this time it only applied to existing states, not to people or
national societies. Falkowski, supra note 92.
Press Release, U.N. Security Council, Res. 1263, supra note 45.
113.
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Among States (hereinafter "Friendly Relations Declaration") defined the
right of "all people ... freely to determine, without external interference,
their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural
development."114
From Jefferson and Wilson to the League of Nations, U.N. resolutions to
multinational treaties and conventions,1I5 and numerous other legal
documents, a rich eighty year progeny has emerged. Its widely-accepted
nature perpetually strengthened the precedent of self-determination.116
From the recognition by numerous legal instruments and ongoing state
practice, a set of norms emerged and the right to self-determination
achieved customary international law status. 1I7 Customary law is defined
by Article 38(l)(b) of the ICJ-- a "general practice accepted as law."lIs
The ICJ's declaration in its advisory opinion on Namibia, Resolutions
1514,1541,2625, and others, to represent, "the subsequent development
of international law in relation to non-self-governing territories, as
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, made the principle of
self-determination applicable to all of them."119
Expressing his
agreement with this position, Justice Dillard stated in his opinion in the
case of Western Sahara that:
the cumulative impact of many resolutions similar in content,
voted for by overwhelming majorities and frequently repeated
over a period of time may give rise to a general opinion juris and
thus constitute a norm of customary international law .... [T]his
is the precise situation manifested by the long list of resolutions
which, following in the wake of resolution 1514 (XV), have
proclaimed the principle of self-determination to be an operative
right in the decolonization of non-self-governing-territories. 120

114.
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations available at
http://www.hku.edullaw/conlawwhklconlaw/outlinelOutline4/2625.htrn signed at the I 883'd plenary
meeting 24 October 1970. [referred to as Friendly Relations Doctrine]
liS.
The common Article I of the Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights states that all peoples have the right to self-determination.
116.
Falkowski, supra note 108 at p. 212.
117.
See, Hanauer supra note 5, at p.152 [resolutions drafted by the United Nations established
norms of self-determination in the context of decolonialization have risen to the status of customary
international law]; Robert T. Vance, Jr., Recognition as an Affirmative Step in the Decolonization
Process: The Case of Western Sahara, 7 Yale 1. World Pub. Ord. 45 (1980-1 98\). ["The right of
colonial peoples to self-determination is a widely accepted norm of customary international law."]
118.
I.C.J. art 38(1)(b) supra note 67.
119.
The Legal Consequences for States for the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Res. 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 4 (June 2\), at
p.31.
120.
Western Sahara, supra, note 7 at p.121 (separate opinion of Dillard, J.)
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The right to self-determination as it is defined within the Declaration on
Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, in the 1960
General Assembly Resolution, advances the strongest evidence to
declare the principal as customary international law. l2l The resolution
stating self-determination is a right, giving a people freedom to
determine their political status, and to pursue their economic, social and
cultural development. 122 Resolution 1514 achieved special status by
being unanimously adopted. The U.N. Office of Legal Affairs has since
expressed that "[i]n view of the greater solemnity and significance of a
declaration, it may be considered to impart, on behalf of the organ
adopting it, a strong expectation that members of the international"
community will abide by it. Consequently, in so far as the expectation is
gradually justified by State practice, a declaration may by custom
become recognized as laying down rules biding upon States."123
Moreover, the 1971 IC] advisory opinion on, the legal consequences for
states of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa) stated, " ... the last fifty years ... have brought important
developments. These developments leave little doubt that the cumulative
objective of the sacred trust ... was the self-determination and
independence of peoples concerned. In this domain, as elsewhere, the
corpus juris gentium has been considerably enriched, and this Court, if it
is faithfully to discharge its functions, may not ignore."124
The notion of state practice presents a precursory barrier to a principle
obtaining customary international law status, supported by the IC],
which articulates that "the material of customary international law is to
be looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinion juris of
states."125 The right to self-determination as developed by U.N.
institutions has been supported by state practice. Well over seventy
territories and former colonies have been decolonized since 1946, with

121.
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res.
1514(XV) (Dec. 14, 1960).
122.
[d.
123.
Memo of 2 Apr. 1962 (quoted in United Nations, The Right to Self-Determination:
Historical and Current Development on the Basis of United Nations Instruments (Aurelie Cristescu,
Special Rapporteur), U.N. Doc. FlCNA/Sub.21404/Rev.1 (\981), at para. 262).
124.
Legal consequence for states of continued presence of South Africa in Namibia (south
West Africa) advisory opinion of (21 June) 1971 I.C.J. 16. For full discussion see, The United
Nations, Self-Detennination and the Namibia Opinions,82 Yale L. 1. 533 (\973).
125.
Nicaragua v. United States, 1986I.C.J. 14 (June 27), para. 183
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many of them choosing to become sovereign states and members of the
U.N.l26
The General Assembly has outlined three possible outcomes in
Resolutions 742 and 1541when the right to self-determination has been
exercised on behalf of NSGT: (1) emergence as a sovereign, independent
state; (2) free association within an independent state; or (3) integration
with an independent state. I27 Resolution 1541 states free association
"should be the result of a free and voluntary choice by the peoples of
territory concerned, expressed through informed and democratic
process"128 with integration that is "the result of the freely expressed
wishes of the territory's peoples ... their wishes having been expressed
through informed and democratic processes, impartially conducted and
based on universal adult suffrage." Justice Dillard, in his advisory
opinion, articulated the ideal of a free choice concisely by "selfdetermination is satisfied by a free choice, not by a particular
consequence of that choice or a particular method of exercising it."129
The I.C.J. Western Sahara Case addressed "the principle of selfdetermination as a right of peoples, and its application for the purpose of
bringing all colonial situations to a speedy end, where enunciated in the
DecIaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, General Assembly resolution 1514 ..... The above provisions, in
particular paragraph two, thus confirm and emphasize that the
application of the right of self-determination requires a free and genuine
expression of the will of people concerned."I3°
B.

EAST TIMOR

The cases of Western Sahara and East Timor are the two most prominent
failures of decolonization. Morocco's annexation of Western Sahara and
Indonesia's invasion and occupation of East Timor were both carried out
in 1975 by former colonies seeking their own territories to colonize.
Both were categorically ilIegal.l3I Indonesia occupied East Timor for
twenty-five years after the withdrawal of Portugal, tirelessly waging war
against those fighting for East Timorese independence. Indonesia, unlike
126.
Deborah Z. Cass, Rethinking Self-Determination: A Critical Analysis of Current
International Law Theories, IS Syracuse J.In!'1 L. & Com. 21, 27 (1991-92).
127.
G.A. Res. 742, U.N. GAOR, SIh Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 21, U.N. Doc. N2630 (1953); G.A.
Res. 1514 supra note 101.
12S.
(1960).
129.
130.
131.

G.A. Res. 1541, U.N. GAOR, 151h Sess., Supp. No. 16, at Principle IV, U.N. Doc. N46S4

Western Sahara, supra note 7, at 115 (separate opinion of Dillard, J.)
Western Sahara case, supra note 7.
Ian Martin, Self-Determination in East Timor: The United Nations. the Ballot and the
Illternationallntervention 15 (2001).
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Morocco, allowed for a referendum in 1999 and permitted a choice
between independence and autonomy.I32 Following a vote establishing
independence, those loyal to Indonesia began massacring the East
Timorese, resulting in an intervention by international peacekeeping
forces.133 The result was U.N. Security Council Resolution 1272,134
which provided U.N. Administration of East Timor for a two-and-a-halfyear period. 135 Meanwhile, there was shared sovereignty between the
U.N and East Timor, providing the time necessary for East Timor to
build the required institutions for an independent self-government. 136
Upon successful completion of established benchmarks, East Timor was
recognized in May of 2002 as an independent nation and granted
member status at the U.N.137
Conversely, in the case of East Timor, Indonesia committed gross
violations of international human rights law by killing roughly one-third
of the population, thereby thrusting the conflict onto the international
stage. 138 While Western Sahara has had its fair share of human rights
violations,139 it has not yet reached the extent of the East Timor
"genocide." Tragically, without enough human slaughter for the U.N. to
act upon, there are no world news headlines and without world headlines
there is no outpouring of support for the cause of Western Sahara or its
people. 140 Furthermore, the U.N. sent thousands of troops to aid in the

132.
S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. Doc. SIRESII272 (1999); East Timor Popular Consultation, May 5,
1999, Indon.·Port., U.N. SCOR, 53 n1 Sess., U.N. Doc. S1999/513, Annex II (1999). View at
http://www.un.orglpeaceletimor99/agreementlagreeFrame_Eng04.html; Agreement Regarding the
Modalities for the Popular Consolation of the East Timorese Through Direct Ballot, May 5, 1999,
Indon.·Port., U.N. SCO, 53,d Sess., Annex II, at 24, U.N. Doc. S1I999/513 (1999) available at
http://www.un.orglpeaceletimor99/areementlagreeFrame_Eng03.html
133.
Martin, supra note 112.
134.
U.N. Res. 1272 7057 th mtg. SIRES/1272 25 Oct. (1999).
Available at
http://daccessdds.un.orgldoc/UNDOClGENIN99/312177IPDFIN9931277. pdf?OpenElement
135.
Id. See also, Tania Voon, Closing the Gap between Legitimacy and Legality of Human
Intervention: Lessons from East Timor and Kosovo, 7 UCLA J. 1n!'1 L. & Foreign Aff. 31 (2002).
136.
!d.
137.
Id.
138.
/d.
139.
Note, more than 150,000 Saharawi's continue to live in inhospitable conditions in five
refugee camps. Documented by the Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the U.S. State
Department the people of Western Sahara have suffered such gross violations of international
humanitarian law as forced disappearances, rape and torture. See, Amnesty international public
statement, MoroccolWestem Sahara; Investigate allegations of tourture of Sahrawi human rights
defender, (12 May 2009). Available at http://www.amnesty.orglenllibrary/assetIMDE29/00412009/
en/fa I b53c6-264a-4fbf-859f-f73cd2b5cb57/mde29004200gen.pdf
140.
See, William Reisinger, Beyond "De-Nile" The United Nations' Genocide Problem in
Darfur 23 Touro L. Rev. 685 (2007). Take for example the failure of the U.N. to act until significant
amounts of blood was shed during the Darfur conflict. There was evidence of increased tensions
noted by U.N. peacekeeping troops i.e. the making of hatches and manipulative paraphernalia.
However, the U.N. pulled all peacekeeping troops out of the area which, has been cited as a
contributing factor in the complete deterioration of the situation and the subsequent genocide. After
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East Timor conflict, whereas the U.N. only sent hundreds of troops with
no direct mandate-- especially regarding human rights into Western
Sahara. As of March 31, 2008, the military component of MINURSO
totaled 216 personnel, including administrative and medical officers.141
The ability to hasten the entitled freedom to Western Sahara, like that of
East Timor, is in the hands of the U.N. Security Council. The Council
could advance the overdue freedom simply by vigorously implementing
resolutions for a free and fair referendum. 142 Part IV will discuss the
adoption of a different approach from that of East Timor regarding selfdetermination for the people of Western Sahara based on the geopolitical
interests of the Security Council members.
C.

RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION IS LINKED PROPORTIONALLY TO
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION

This note has highlighted the right of people to self-determination as one
of the cornerstone principles of the international framework. The
progeny of the principle has lead to its incorporation as a fundamental
tenant in the U.N. Charter, enshrined as a fundamental right in all of the
U.N.' s ancillary documents which comprise the international bill of
rights.143 As discussed above the consistent repetition of the principle
right of self-determination has been heightened to the status of jus
cogens. The right to self-determination is unique, unlike other human
rights, it is not an individual right, rather it is a right of the "people"
collectively. This section will examine self-determination as it is
affected by human rights violations to the collective. The right will be
strengthened by the inherent need to preserve and protect the collective
right of a state to govern itself in accordance with its own cultural norms,
free from outside interference. The incorporation of the human rights
element will server to bolster the case for Western Sahara.
Article 21 of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights implicitly
recognizes the principle of self-determination stating, "[e]veryone has
the right to take part in the government of his country ... [t]he will of the
people shall be the basis of the authority of the government expressed in
which the U.N.'s reemerged presences was met with a stronger mandate backed by the global
conscious in light of the genocide.
141.
U.N. Security Council Report of the Secretary-General on Situation Concerning Western
Sahara, S120081251 14 April 2008, at 4. For further information see section IV. Activities on the
Ground section A. Military.
View hup://www.globalpolicy.orglsecurity/issues/wsahara/
200S/04I 4sgrwsahara.pdf
142.
U.N. Press Release GNCOU2928, Special Committee on Decoloniwtion takes up
Questions of Western Sahara. East Ti/llOr. Hears Petitioners. and (30 June 1998). 19950630 view at
http://www.un.orglpeace/etimor99/199Spr/gac0292S.htm
143.
U.N. Charter Articles I para. 2, 55, and 56;
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the periodic and genuine elections."I44 The preamble to the declaration
states: "It is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a
last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights
should be protected by the rule of law."145 Similarly in the Declaration of
Independence Thomas Jefferson expressed the ideal that it is the
inalienable right of the people to "alter or abolish any government that
does not recognize these rights." 146 The European community adopted
guidelines on recognition of new states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union which underlined the need to respect the rule of law, democracy
and human rights, and, specifically, guarantees for the rights of
minorities. 147 " .... The conflict in Western Sahara is one of the most
tragic and obvious illustrations of the reasons why human rights issues
cannot be treated separately from the broader context of international
law."148 The new working definition for self-determination must include
customary human rights standards and the right of an appropriate body to
enforce those standards. Article 55 of the Charter requires its member
States to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms. 149 In
addition, various other human rights doctrines identify the right to selfdetermination. 150 The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights specifically mentions the right of self-determination. Article One
states that "[A]ll Peoples have the right of self-determination," signifying
that human rights are not only exercised once but are permanent and
continuous. 151 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights expressed the standpoint that "territorial integrity of a
state cannot dominate over the right of all peoples to self-determination,

Universal Declaration of Human Rights. G.A.Res. 217, 3'd Sess., p. I, Supp. No.2, art. 21
Id., at Preamble, para 3.
146.
Falkowski, supra note 92.
147.
Guidelines on Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 16
December 1991.
148. Margot Kessler, President European Parliament Intergroup. Peace for the Saharawi
People. Press Statement (18 April 2002). View at http://www.arso.orglmkesslerI80402.htm
149.
U.N. Charter, Art. 55; Universial Declaration of Human Rights, Article 21; and
International covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article One (1976).; International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article One (1976). The word of Article one for both
Covenants is the same:
All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without
prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic cooperation, based upon the
principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case maya people be deprived of its own
means of subsistence.
150.
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted
by the U.N. General Assembly in 1960; the International covenant on Civil and Political Rights
1976; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights also 1976; the U.N.
Friendly Relations Declaration unanimously adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1970; and the
opinions of the I.C.J ..
151.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21 st
Sess., Supp. No. 16 art, I para I, U.N.Doc. Al363 16 (1966).
144.
145.
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because it is not compatible with the nature of the right, in fact it would
destroy it."152
D.

KosovO: THE CASE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AS SELFDETERMINAnON

Kosovo's situation regarding the right to self-determination is
distinguishable from that of Western Sahara in that Kosovo is seeking to
secede from Yugoslavia as a minority within an existing State. Kosovo's
desire to secede stems from massive human rights violations as opposed
to the Sahrawis' colonially imposed rule. The Yugoslav and Serbian
administrative powers have been practicing institutionalized systematic
discrimination of the Kosovar ethnic Albanians since 1919. 153 During
this same period, the Kosovar's have been strengthening their resolve
towards self-governance. 154 There is an obvious pattern of "methodical
discrimination" by the Yugoslavian government against the minority
Kosovars, spanning an eighty year period. 155 Practiced discriminatory
policies have included colonization programs and ethnic cleansing. 156
Legal scholars have highlighted that this pattern of systematic
discrimination has risen to the level of a gross violation of fundamental
human rights, tantamount to a viable threat on the Kosovars existence. 157
The prospect for lasting peace only exists with Kosovo declaring its
independence, due to the fact ethnic Albanians are expected to continue
to suffer horrific persecution at the hands of the Serbian leadership. As a
result, on February 17, 2008, Kosovo's parliament declared "Kosovo to
be an independent and sovereign state."158 Kosovo's declaration of
independence has since been formally recognized by the U.S. and several
European countries. 159 The U.N.'s involvement with Kosovo's path
152.
G.A.Res. 2200, U.N.GAOR, 21" Sess., Supp. No. 16, art. 2, para I, U.N.Doc A63616
(1996).
153.
Jennifer P. Harris, Kosovo: An Application of the Principle of Self-Detennination 6 No.3
Hum. Rts Brief 2S (1999).
154.
Id.
155.
Id.
156.
Id.
157.
/d. Due to the killing and displacement of thousands of civilians throughout 1995-1999.
15S.
Christoper J. Borgen, Kosovo's Declaration of Independence:
Self-Detennination.
Secession and Recognition. The American Society of International Law Insight Vol. 12, Issue 2
(February 29, 200S) at \. http://www.asil.orglinsightsI200S/02linisghtsOS0229.htmISee also, Kosovo
Declaration. BBC News (Feb 17, 200S). http://news.bbc.co.ukl2/hi/europel724967.stm (full text).
159.
Id.
See
also,
S.c.
Res
1244
(10
June
1999)
available
at
http://www.nato.intlKosovo/docu/u990610a.htm (Resolution 1244).
U.S. Recognizes Kosovo as Independent State, statement of Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice
Washington D.C. (Feb IS (200S). available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/200S/
02l100973.htm U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced the following day on February
IS, 2008 the U.S. "formal recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state."
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toward independence began after NATO's intervention in 1999 with
Security Council resolution 1244, which established the international
oversight of Kosovo in order to resolve its legal status. 160 Similar to the
case with Western Sahara, the U.N. Secretary General appointed Special
Envoy, Martti Ahtisaari. Ahtisaari mediated negotiations between the
parties for fifteen months, at which time he submitted the
Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement ("the
Ahtisaari Plan").161 The Ahtisaari Plan is much like its counterpart, the
Baker Peace Plan for Western Sahara. It outlined a framework for
independence, calling for a period of international supervision. 162 The
plan was received in the same manner as the Baker Peace Plan. It was
endorsed by the Kosovar leadership and was rejected by Serbia.
Subsequently, the Troika commission was created to revive the stalled
negotiations process. The commission found that, "[T]he parties were
unable to reach an agreement on the final status of Kosovo. Neither
party was willing to cede its position on the fundamental question of
sovereignty over KOSOVO."163
The operative ianguage of Security Council Resolution 1244 calls for (1)
the commencement of demilitarization of armed groups in Kosovo; (2)
the establishment of an international civilian presence under the auspices
of the U.N. to assist in interim administration; (3) the commencement of
international financial assistance to Kosovo; and (4) setting out ongoing
reporting requirements. l64 This Resolution ensures the progression of a
new era of self-determination and succession. Kosovo's path to selfdetermination, like that of East Timor, is embedded in eradicating human
rights violations which threaten the extinction of a population.
Resolution 1244 called it a "grave humanitarian situation" and a "threat
to the international peace and security."165
What are the implications of extending a human rights component to the
principle of self-determination for Western Sahara? First, it highlights
the inconsistencies of the U.N.'s Security Council's power in how it

Nicholas Kuilsh and C.J. Chivers, Kosovo Is Recognized by Rebuked by Others. NY TIMES (Feb 19
2008) available at http://www.nytimes.coml20081102l19/worldleuropelI9kosovo.html?pagewanted=
2&hp. Highlighting recognition by France, the U.K., Germany and several other EU members'
states.
160.
Id.
161.
Id.
162.
Id.
163.
Report of the EUIU.S.lRussia Troika on Kosovo, para. I (Dec. 4, 2007) available at
http://www.ico-kos.orglpdflReport%200f%20the%20EU-USRussia%20Troika%200n%20Kosovo.pdf
164.
Resolution 1244 supra note, lOS.
165.
Id.
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applies self-determination to a people affected by human rights
violations.
In Kosovo's case, the Security Council recognized a
declaration for independence that was not based on international legal
standards. However, in the case Western Sahara the Security Council
opposed the right to self-determination which the international legal
standards clearly favor. 166 The true and lasting impact of Kosovo's
declaration of independence is what matters most. At the end of the day,
is what best suits the Western powers interests.
E.

THE NORMATIVE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT TO NATURAL
RESOURCES

In focusing this section on the expansion of the right to selfdetermination to include a resource dimension this article will be able to
concurrently reinforce the case of Western Sahara. By sheer virtue of the
right to self-determination, all peoples possess the right to advance their
own economic, cultural and social development including the freedom to
govern their own natural resources. 167 The 1982 U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea states that "coastal States have sovereign rights over
natural resources on the continental shelf outside of their own land
territory."168 Morocco has no sovereignty over Western Sahara as
developed above and therefore, no right to explore and exploit Western
Sahara's resources. Article 73, of the U.N. Charter further stipulates that
the economic exploration of natural resources in NSGT may only take
place given express consent of the local population and must be in
accordance with their economic interests. 169
Trade agreements by countries without permission from Western Sahara
which involve their natural resources are a direct violation of
international law.l7O Morocco as an occupying power, " ... can only use
property to the extent that it is necessary for the administration of the
occupied territory [Western Sahara] and to cover the needs of the
soldiers and never to cover the occupying State's own needs or to
improve their own economy."l7l France, alongside the European Union,

166.
Francois Gouahinga, Kosovo Revives Hopes for Secession (February 26, 200S) view at
http://allafrica.comlstories/printablel200S022601 OS. hmtl
167.
U.N. Res 1514, supra note 12.
16S.
United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, Agreement Realty to implementation of
Part XI of Convention, full text view at http://www.un.orglDeptsllos/convention_agreementsltextsl
uncloslclosindx.htm
U.N. Charter Article 73, supra note 3.
169.
170.
Letter dated 29 January 2002, from Undersecretary of the United Nations for Legal Affairs
Hans Corell to the President of the Security Council, S/2002/161 (12 February 2002) ("Opinion") at
2.
171.

[d.
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has aided Morocco in perpetuating the pillaging conspiracy against
Western Sahara's right to self-determination, including control over their
natural resources when they entered into the European Fisheries
Agreement. 172 The Agreement contracted for 144 million Euros to be
paid to Morocco in exchange for 119 European fishing boats to fish
along the Atlantic coastal waters of Western Sahara.173 Again in 200 I, an
American energy company, Kerr McGee, and a French Oil Company,
TotalFinaELF, entered into contracts with Morocco for oil exploration
off the coast of Western Sahara. 174 In January of 2002, the U.N. UnderSecretary-General for legal affairs stated, " .... if further exploration and
exploitation activities were to proceed in disregard of their interests and
wishes of the people of Western Sahara, they would be in violation of the
principles of international law applicable to mineral resource activities in
Non-Self-Governing-Territories."175
The right to self-determination
encompasses the right to protect and control natural resources, as they
are the life blood of nations and frequently the catalyst to war and
geopolitical agendas.
PART FOUR: RELIANCE ON POWER POLITICS OVER THE LAW

Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make
violent revolution inevitable.
John Fitzgerald Kennedy (March 12, 1962)176
A

U.N. INEFFECTIVE MECHANISM OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL DUE TO
POLITICALLY BASED DECISIONS

In dealing with the case of Western Sahara, the U.N. has allowed itself to
be a geopolitical pawn in the maneuverings of two minor regional
powers: Morocco and Algeria. "Every State has the duty to refrain from
organizing, instigating assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or
terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within
its territorial directed towards the commission of such acts, when the acts
referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force."177
Member states are under a duty to bring about a speedy end to
172.
Enrico Milano, The New Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European
Community and the Kingdom of Morocco: Fishing Too Far South? Anuario Espanol de Derecho
International vol. XXII, 2006. (20 April 2007) p. 1-3
173.
Id.
174. Williams and Zunes, supra note 25.
175. Hans Corell Opinion, supra note 171.
176.
Falkowski, supra note 92, quoting from John Barlett, Familiar Quotations 1073 (l41h ed.
1982).
177. U.N. Friendly Relations Doctrine, supra note 99.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2009

29

136

Annual
Survey of International
Comparative
Vol. 15 [2009],
Iss. 1, Art.
7 XV
ANNUAL
SURVEY& OF
INT'LLaw,
& COMPo
LAW
[Vol.

colonialism, including due regard for the freely expressed will of the
peoples concerned. I78 States' attitudes toward self-determination shift
and change depending on the impact it could have on a State's selfinterested agenda.
Under the U.N.'s Friendly Relations Declaration,
"strict observance by States of the obligation not to intervene in the
affairs of any other State is an essential condition to ensure that nations
live together in peace with one another since the practice of any form of
intervention not only violates the spirit and letter of the Charter, but also
leads to the creation of situations which threaten international peace and
security."179
As two of the five permanent members with vetoing power of the U.N.
Security Council, France and the U.S. have blocked the Council from
enforcing its resolutions in regard to Western Sahara. 18o Both countries
have perceived a historical need to strengthen the Moroccan monarchy as
a barrier against Communism and radical Arab nationalism during the
Cold War. 181 More recently, Morocco has served as an important ally in
the battle against Islamic extremism. 182 The U.N. has been an abysmal
failure in regard to Western Sahara. The resolution should have been
tailor-made for the U.N. - hold a referendum to allow the people of
Western Sahara to decide whether to be free or integrate with Morocco.
Yet, after the cease-fire, and MINURSO with a staggering operational
budget of six hundred million dollars, the referendum has gone
nowhere. 183 It is an ironclad stalemate. Moreover, the referendum
process as whole has been met with gross irregularities and
improprieties. The chief setback relates to the misuse of administrative
control, on paper this task is assigned to MINURSO, on the ground a
different story emerges, the referendum or lack thereof has been strictly
controlled by the Moroccan government. 184
The U.S. has not made any attempt to distinguish itself by setting a
higher standard. From the beginning U.S. power politics affected its
duty under international customary law. U.N. Ambassador Daniel
178.
U.N. Charter, supra note 3 See Chap. I Purposes and Principles supra, note 7.
179.
U.N. Friendly Relations Doctrine, supra note 99.
180.
The Permanent Five members of the Security Council with vetoing power are the U.S.,
France, the United Kingdom, China, and Russia. The Security Council is comprised of fifteen total
members' ten rotating members from the General Assembly all lacking vetoing power.
Yahia H. Zoubir, The Western Sahara Conflict: A Case Study in Failure of Pre181.
Negotiation and Prolongation of Conflict, 26 Cal. W. Int'l LJ. 173,192-193 (1996).
War and Terrorism, U.S. Praises Morocco's
182.
Id., See also, The Threat Report:
'Comprehensive Counterterrorism Approach' and 'International Coooperation' to Combat Rising alQaeda
Threat
in
Sahara,
PRNewswire
(I
May
2009)
available
at
hnp:llthreatreport.blogspot.comJ2009/05/us-praises-moroccos-comprehensive.html
183.
G.A.Res. AB/3834, U.N., 62 bd Sess., (12 May 2008).
184.
See, Bhatia supra note 38 at 801.
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Moynihan recounted his job during the Cold War years, as a duty to
oppose an independent state for the Saharawi's.185 "No new Angola on
the west coast of Africa l86 was his instruction from then Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger.
According to declassified White House
documents, Kissinger is cited as saying in reference to Morocco's
unsanctioned and illegal entry into the Western Sahara during the 1975
"Green March," "if we had prevented it we would have destroyed our
relationship with Morocco."187 The U.S. has proven by its actions, they
are not abiding by the principles enumerated within the Friendly
Relations Declaration cited above. Despite the termination of the Cold
War, the U.S. still refuses to use its favored relationship with Morocco or
its position as a vetoing member on the Security Council to ensure
Sahrawi people are provided the right of self-determination, one of the
most important and basic human rights the U.N. was created to protect.
This U.S.'s behavior is in starch contradiction to its origins as a colony
breaking away from its colonial master, England, in its inalienable right
to freedom through self-determination.
As indicated above, both the U.S. and France have attempted to utilize
their close relationship with Morocco to exploit Western Sahara for its
resources: oil and fish stocks. France, as a vetoing member on the U.N.
Security Council, has close political ties to Morocco as its foremost
trading partner and provider of developmental aid. France's close
relationship to Morocco has led France in successfully preventing
condemnation by the Security Council of the human right violations
committed by Morocco. 188 Their relationship has additionally prevented
the expansion of the MINURSO mandate to include human rights
monitoring in the occupied territories, thereby forcing MINURSO to
stand idly by as a silent witness to the continuing human rights
violations. 189
Furthermore, Spain unlike its neighbor Portugal, who played a leadership
role in supporting the liberation of East Timor from Indonesian

185.
Frank Ruddy, Questions for ABA Program on Democracy in the Middle East, question 3,
(2005) p. 2. available at www.abanet.orglintlaw/calendar/spring2005/papers/33.15.doc
186.
/d.
187.
Jacob Mundy, Thirty years of Conflict: How the U.S. and Morocco seized the Spanish
Sahara, Le Monde diplomatique (Jan. 2006) View at httpJ/mondediplo.coml2006/01112asahara
International known scholar, Thomas Franck, later described U.S. policy during the crisis as "an act
of political expedience grounded in EastlWest political alliances." Further suggesting the only
difference between 1975 and 2005 in regard to geopolitical politics is the exchange of the Cold War
for the War on Terror (see infra. discussion part V(b)).
See, Yahiasupra note 181 at 182 and 202.
188.
189.
In the periods of 2005 ·2006 alone almost every single leading human rights activist in
Western Sahara was arrested. CITE
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occupation as the. former colonial power has played no such role and, in
fact, has done quite the opposite. Spain has placed a higher value on
maintaining good neighborly relations with Morocco.
A strong
motivator behind the controversial 2006 fishing agreement, previously
mentioned, between the European Union and Morocco was the
advancement of friendly relations and monetary gain. From these
incidents alone it is enough to conclude that the duties and
responsibilities of member states of the U.N., the principles and norms of
international customary law, and the right to self-determination have
taken a back seat to power politics and nation-state self-interest.
PART FIVE: MOROCCO'S 2007 PLAN AND FUTURE
CONSEQUENCES
A.

MOROCCO'S 2007 PLAN

"The Moroccan autonomy plan aims at legitimatizing the
occupation ... "190 Falling well below what is required to bring about a
peaceful resolution to the conflict is Morocco's 2007 Autonomy Plan
supported by the U.S. and France was cited as "serious and credible" and
a "constructive contribution to finding a solution to the conflict."191
Irreparable damage will occur if the proposal is implemented, as it stands
the plan would categorically alter the foundation of the post-World War
II international legal system. The autonomy plan, which re-Iegitimizes
colonization through military occupation, is premised on the notion that
Western Sahara is part of Morocco--a view strongly contested by the
U.N. Charter, the IC}, the African Union, and various other international
sources. Acceptance of the autonomy plan would be the first time since
the founding of the U.N. and the ratification of its Charter more than
sixty years ago, the international community would be endorsing the
expansion of a country's territory by military force, resulting in a
dangerous and destabilizing precedent. l92
Further complicating the situation is the lack of an enforcement
mechanism provided in the proposal, and Morocco has a history of
breaking its promises to the international community in regards to the
U.N.-mandated referendum for the Western Sahara. 193 Upon closer

190.
M.S. Ould Salek, SADR Foreign Affairs Minister during a press conference held in
Algiers, June 11,2007.
191.
Jacob Mundy, Western Sahara Between Autonomy and Imifada Middle East Report Online
(March 16, 2007). available at hnp:llwww.merip.org/mero/mero031607.html
192.
Jacob Mundy, Western Sahara: Against Autonomy Foreign Policy in Focus John Feffer
(ed.) (24 April 2007) available at http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4172
193.
Id. See also, Mundy, supra note 162.
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inspection, the proposal is offering limited autonomy at best, particularly
in regards to natural resources and law enforcement beyond local
matters. 194 According to Article 19 of Morocco's constitution, the Sultan
(King) of Morocco is ultimately vested with absolute authority and,
therefore, the autonomy proposal insist Moroccan "keep its powers in the
royal domains, especially with respect to defense, external relations and
the constitutional and religious prerogatives of His Majesty the King."195
Unmistakably giving the monarch considerable leeway in interpretation
of the plan and control over its autonomous "colony" Western Sahara.
B.

CONSEQUENCES OF NOT GRANTING FULL INDEPENDENCE

Further aggravation and acceleration of human rights violations, the
destabilization of an already unstable region with global implications, as
well as setting a bad legal precedent as described above is just the tip of
the iceberg if self-determination of Western Sahara is not advanced. It is
time to heed the lessons from the past which clearly demonstrate that any
solution against or ignoring the right of self-determination and
reinstitution of colonization is not built for longevity. The tragic and
bloodstained universal truth is that not granting a people's right to selfdetermination is a major cause of wars and revolutions. 196 Historically,
centralized autocratic governments seldom ever respect the autonomy of
regional jurisdictions, which classically lead to violent conflict and
genocides. 197 For example, in 1952 the U.N. granted the British
protectorate and former Italian colony of Eritrea autonomous status
federated with Ethiopia. 198 Ethiopia's emperor in 1961 revoked Eritrea's

194.
195.

[d.
[d.

196.
Falkowski. supra note 92 quoting from John Barlett, Familiar Quotations 1073 (14th ed.
1982). In the words of President Kennedy, "for the development of this organization (the UN) rests
the only true alternative to war, and war appeals no longer as a rational alternative. Unconditional
war can no longer lead to unconditional victory. It can no longer serve to settle disputes. It can no
longer be of concern to great powers alone. For a nuclear disaster, spread by winds and waters and
fear, could well engulf the great and the small, the rich and the poor, the committed and the
uncommitted alike. Mankind must put an end to war or war will put an end to mankind. So let us
resolve that Dag Hammerskjold did not live, or die, in vain. Let us call a truce to terror."
197.
Lego Kuper, Genocide, 183 (1981). "Some of the most destructive and genocidal conflicts
have been waged precisely in the repression of claims for greater autonomy or for independence by
large, distinctive, regionally separate peoples. And one has to ask whether the slaughter of millions
of Bangladesh, Biafra, the Sudan, and now in Eritrea can possibly be justified by the interest of the
Territorial State in relative unrestrained exercise of its internal sovereignty and in the preservation of
domains it has conquered or inherited? Or is there a need for the United Nations to abandon a
dehumanized scale of values which effectively condones the sacrifice of human victims to the
Territorial State?"
198.
Bereket Habte Selassie, Self-Detennination in Principal and Practice: the EthiopianEritrean Experience 29 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 91 (1997).
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autonomous status, annexing it as his empires new province. 199 The
result was a thirty-nine year battle marked by death and violence. 2oo
Western Sahara is a clear cut case of self-determination for a people
struggling against foreign military occupation. The Polisario Front has
already offered guarantees to protect Moroccan strategic and economic
interest if allowed full independence. To insist that the people of
Western Sahara give up their moral and legal right to a genuine and free
referendum, is not a formula for conflict resolution, but rather a recipe
for a far more serious conflict in the future. Now is the "most opportune
time to break the cycle of compromise and accommodation, of realpolitik
and to adopt a no-nonsense attitude to the issue."2ol
CONCLUSION: AN ARGUMENT FOR CHAPTER 7 USE OF FORCE

The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and
exploitation constitutes a major obstacle to the promotion of
international peace and security, convinced that the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples constitutes a
significant contribution to contemporary international law, and
that its effective application is of paramount importance for the
promotion of friendly relations among States, based on respect
for the principle of sovereign equality.202
Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption other than national
unity and territorial integrity of a State or country or in regard to p0.Iitical
independence is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the
U.N. Charter. 203

199.
[d.
200.
[d.
201.
U.N. Press release 1998, supra note 92.
202.
Friendly Relations Doctrine, supra note 96. Codifying the following principles:
(a) Principle that states shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independent of any State, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN.
(b) State shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner than
international peace and security and justice are not endangered.
(c) Duty not to intervene in matter within domestic jurisdiction of any State, in
accordance with the Charter.
(d) Duty to cooperate wi th each other.
(e) Principle of equal right and self-determination of peoples.
(f) Sovereign quality of states
(g) States shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with
the Charter.
203.
See, Vance lr. supra, note 118.
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Every state has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force to
violate the existing international boundaries of another State or as a
means of solving international disputes, including territorial disputes?04
Every Member State, including Morocco, has a duty to refrain from any
forcible action which deprives other peoples' rights of equality and self
determination synonymous with their freedom and independence.2os
Furthermore, as members of the U.N., each state is obligated to promote
the realization of self-determination and to respect that right in
accordance with the provisions of the U.N. Charter. 206 All obligations
that deal with preemptory and customary law, such as the right to selfdetermination, are applied erga omnes in relation to all--not just between
parties.207 All states must then do what is in their power to make the
parties respect their obligations. In light of the articles on state
responsibility, individual states have a "duty of non-recognition" of gross
violations of international law. The lack of political will and nation-state
self-interest has corrupted the foundational Charter of the U.N. and made
it possible for Morocco to continue denying the Sahrawi's their right to
self-determination.
The U.N. Security Council's involvement in using force to implement
the referendum and its outcome is restricted to its powers of collective
security found in Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter. 208 In order to call upon
this power, the Council must first satisfy Article 39, indentifying either a
salient threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of
aggression. 209 A mounting salient threat has been established-by
occupying Western Sahara and blocking the referendum from allowing
any choice of independence, Morocco actions are identical to the role of
a colonial power. Morocco has also violated international law by
invading Western Sahara by force in the 1975 "Green March." This one
action translates to a cognizable breach of international peace and
security, violating the U.N. Charter invoking Chapter 7 Security Council
powers.2lO To further support the "Green March" as an act of aggressive
204.
U.N. Charter, supra note 3.
205.
/d.
206.
Id.
207.
Gerry Simpson, Judging the East Tinwr Dispute: Self-Determination at the International
Court of Justice 17 Hasting lnt'l and Compo L. Rev. 323 (1994).
208.
U.N. Charter, supra note 3, Chap VII.
209.
Id.
210.
U.N. Charter art 2, para 4 stating that "all members shall refrain in their international
relations form the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Morocco will
argue that since the Western Sahara does not meet the technical definition of an independent state,
they have not violated this provision. However, the Green March and subsequent illegal occupation
of Western Sahara by Moroccan troops does clearly violate the provision, and both events contradict
the main tenants of the United Nations.
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force on the part of Morocco, Special Rapporteur Cristescu states, "The
use of force against another State may take various forms: for instance,
actions conducted by regular or irregular forces; by forces of volunteers
or by armed bands; acts of reprisal; invasion; or pressure or coercion of
various kinds."211
In U.N. resolution 1783,212 which again extended the mandate of
MINURSO, the U.N. Secretary General noted there was a conspicuous
increase in violence in Western Sahara not seen in years past.213 The
U.N. has been denied access to Morocco's military installations within
the occupied territory of Western Sahara. 214 This lack of access
traditionally has been associated with rising tensions as a precursor to
violence.2I5 The Security Council has previously utilized its Chapter 7
powers to terminate conflicts which are not forthcoming and where the
situation is classified as threat to international peace and security.216 For
example, the case of Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990 when the
Security Council invoked Chapter 7 and went to the military defense of
Kuwait. Since 1990, over 1000 resolutions have been adopted by the
Security Council in accordance with Chapter 7. However, the Security
Council is unwilling to do the same for Western Sahara. Ultimately,
unless war breaks out, no international actor in the current situation
seems able, or willing to initiate a lasting resolution to the conflict.
Another outbreak of war is not implausible. In fact, it is highly probable,
carrying with it the ability to further destabilize the Northern Africa
region and involves the U.S., France, and other countries providing the
potential for a world war scenario.
Morocco must no longer be allowed to place itself above international
law and the U.N. to shirk the fundamental tenant of its Charter. Res ipsa
loquitur, "the thing speaks for itself' is a recognized legal doctrine
within the American legal system. 217 The doctrine is applied to clear-cut
211.
Hector Gros Espiell, Special Rapparteur of the Sub Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, The Right to Self· Determination Implementation of
United
Nations
Resolutions
ElCNA/Sub.21405/Rev.1
(1980).
View
at
http://www.tamilnation.orgiselfdeterminationl80grosespiell.htm
212.
U.N. Security Council Res. 1783(2007), SIResl1783 5773rd mtg. 13 Oct. 2007.
View
at
hnp:l!www.securitycouncilreport.orgiatf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B·6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9% 7DIMINURSO%20SRES 1783.pdf
213.
Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 2007 - MoroccolWestem
Sahara, II January 2007, available at: http://www.unhcr.orglrefworld/docid/45aca2a234.html
214.
See, Yahiasupranote 181 atp.190-192
215.
See generally, Alexandra R. Harrington, Esq., Policing Against the State: United Nations
Policing as Volatile of Sovereignty, 10 San Diego int'I L.1. 155 (2008).
216.
U.N. Charter, supra note 3, at Chp. 7 art. 39.
217.
Honorable Frank Ruddy, fonner Deputy Chainnan, Referendum for Western Sahara
(MINURSO Peacekeeping Operation) Res Ipsa Loquitur: The Thing Speaks for Itself, Statement
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situations where a simple recitation of the facts is sufficient, without
more, to presume culpability of the accused.218 This is the case of
Western Sahara. Judging from a purely international legal standpoint,
Western Sahara has satisfied the Montevideo criteria for statehood- it
has a permanent population, a defined territory, based on Spanish
colonial boundaries; and a government, that, on the relative scale, has
achieved order, stability and importantly recognition by a clear majority
of its fellow state actors. Western Sahara is a budding nation at the
crossroads of the legal and practical struggles between territorial
integrity, self-determination, and unresolved issues regarding what to do
when political actors operate in accordance with catastrophic ambivalent
behaviors in order to advance their own egocentric interests.
The people Western Sahara presently enjoy a right under international
law to self determination. Not only has the ICJ affirmed this right in its
1975 advisory opinion, but it is clear that Western Sahara falls within the
category of "nations"219 who enjoy this right under the U.N. Charter and
the many General Assembly resolutions that define self-determination in particular resolution 1514, the "Declaration on the granting of
independence to colonial countries and peoples"- as well as the two U.N.
human rights covenants (the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights220 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights),221 both carrying the weight of binding law
according to Article 38(l)(a) of the ICJ statute. 222 Moreover, as
mentioned above, the General Assembly and the Security Council have
explicitly recognized the legal right of Western Sahara to selfdetermination in a consistent sequence of resolutions which, collectively,
establish a verifiable right under international law for the case of
Western Sahara.

before the Fourth Committee of The United Nations,
http://defenseforum.orglpromotesdlarticle06.html.
218.

October

10,

2005.

View

at

[d.

219.
Hanaur, supra note 5, citing to II1fNI9 vol. VI, at 704, quoted in the U.N. fright selfdetermination: Historical and current development on basis of U.N. Instruments (Aurelie Cristes,
special rapporteur), U.N. Doc. FlCN.4fsubf2l404lRev I (1981), at para. 262 The term "nation" under
the V.N. is to be determined "broad and general enough to include colonies, mandates, protectorates,
quasi -states as well as states."
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, entered into
220.
force 23 Mar. 1976,999 V.N.T.S. 171.
221.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966,
entered into force 3 Jan. 1976,993 V.N.T.S. 3.
222.
I.C.J. statute, Article 38(1)(a)
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